NixOS Hardening: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 19:48, 16 August 2026

Kernel

linux-hardened

linux-hardened is a Linux kernel with additional hardening patches applied. It can be built from source, but the kernel must be kept up to date to receive security patches. Binary Cache can be used to distribute compiled kernel binaries to multiple computers. You can check for latest releases here.

linux-hardened.nix:

{ pkgs, lib }:

let
  linux_hardened = pkgs.callPackage ({ fetchFromGitHub, buildLinux, ... }:
    buildLinux rec {
      version = "6.18.44-hardened1";
      extraMeta.branch = "6.18";
      hash = "sha256-ncV1k+cLKfWV36oCAkmKb8LnHRJTe6M3IByfcDi8VLI=";
      src = fetchFromGitHub {
        inherit hash;
        owner = "anthraxx";
        repo = "linux-hardened";
        tag = "v${version}";
      };
      kernelPatches = [];
      structuredExtraConfig = with lib.kernel; {
        # Perform additional validation of commonly targeted structures.
            DEBUG_NOTIFIERS = yes;
            DEBUG_PLIST = yes;
            DEBUG_SG = yes;
            DEBUG_VIRTUAL = yes;
            SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK = yes;

            # tell EFI to wipe memory during reset
            # https://lwn.net/Articles/730006/
            RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION = yes;

            # restricts loading of line disciplines via TIOCSETD ioctl to CAP_SYS_MODULE
            CONFIG_LDISC_AUTOLOAD = option no;

            # Enable init_on_free by default
            INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON = yes;

            # Initialize all stack variables on function entry
            INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO = yes;

            # Wipe all caller-used registers on exit from a function
            ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS = yes;

            # Enable the SafeSetId LSM
            SECURITY_SAFESETID = yes;

            # Reboot devices immediately if kernel experiences an Oops.
            PANIC_TIMEOUT = freeform "-1";

            # Enable gcc plugin options
            GCC_PLUGINS = yes;

            # Runtime undefined behaviour checks
            # https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/ubsan.html
            # https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2014/10/16/gcc-undefined-behavior-sanitizer-ubsan
            UBSAN = yes;
            UBSAN_TRAP = yes;
            UBSAN_BOUNDS = yes;
            UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS = option yes; # clang only
            CFI_CLANG = option yes; # clang only Control Flow Integrity since 6.1

            # Disable various dangerous settings
            PROC_KCORE = no; # Exposes kernel text image layout
            INET_DIAG = no; # Has been used for heap based attacks in the past

            # INET_DIAG=n causes the following options to not exist anymore, but since they are defined in common-config.nix,
            # make them optional
            INET_DIAG_DESTROY = option no;
            INET_RAW_DIAG = option no;
            INET_TCP_DIAG = option no;
            INET_UDP_DIAG = option no;
            INET_MPTCP_DIAG = option no;

            # CONFIG_DEVMEM=n causes these to not exist anymore.
            STRICT_DEVMEM = option no;
            IO_STRICT_DEVMEM = option no;

            # stricter IOMMU TLB invalidation
            IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT = option yes;
            IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_LAZY = option no;

            # not needed for less than a decade old glibc versions
            LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE = yes;
      };
      modDirVersion = version;
    }
  ) {};
in
  pkgs.linuxPackagesFor linux_hardened

configuration.nix:

boot.kernelPackages = let
    pkgs = import <nixpkgs> {};
  in
    import ./linux-hardened.nix { inherit pkgs lib; };

Lock kernel modules

This option locks kernel modules after the system is initialized. For example it prevents malicious USB devices from exploiting vulnerable kernel modules.

security.lockKernelModules = true;

All needed modules must be loaded at boot by adding them to boot.kernelModules. One way of knowing what modules must be enabled is to disable this option and then list all enabled modules with lsmod.

boot.kernelModules = [
  # USB
  "usb_storage" "uinput" "usbhid" "usbserial"
  # DVD
  "udf" "iso9660"
  # GPU
  "amdgpu" "i915"
  # Networking
  "nft_chain_nat" "xt_conntrack" "xt_CHECKSUM" "xt_MASQUERADE" "ipt_REJECT" "ip6t_REJECT" "nf_reject_ipv4" "nf_reject_ipv6" "xt_mark" "xt_comment" "xt_multiport" "xt_addrtype" "xt_connmark" "nf_conntrack_netlink"
];

Module blacklist

boot.blacklistedKernelModules = [
  # Obscure network protocols
  "ax25" "netrom" "rose"

  # Old or rare or insufficiently audited filesystems
  "adfs" "affs"
  "bfs" "befs"
  "cramfs"
  "efs" "erofs" "exofs"
  "freevxfs" "f2fs"
  "hfs" "hpfs"
  "jfs"
  "minix"
  "nilfs2" "ntfs"
  "omfs"
  "qnx4" "qnx6"
  "sysv"
  "ufs"
];

Kernel image protection

Prevents replacing the running kernel image.

security.protectKernelImage = true;

Kernel parameters

boot.kernelParams = [
 # Don't merge slabs
 "slab_nomerge"

 # Overwrite free'd pages
 "page_poison=1"

 # Enable page allocator randomization
 "page_alloc.shuffle=1"

 # Disable debugfs
 "debugfs=off"
];

Sysctl parameters

# Hide kptrs even for processes with CAP_SYSLOG
boot.kernel.sysctl."kernel.kptr_restrict" = "2";

# Disable bpf() JIT (to eliminate spray attacks)
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.core.bpf_jit_enable" = false;

# Disable ftrace debugging
boot.kernel.sysctl."kernel.ftrace_enabled" = false;

# Disable io_uring, a large source of security vulnerabilities
# https://security.googleblog.com/2023/06/learnings-from-kctf-vrps-42-linux.html
boot.kernel.sysctl."kernel.io_uring_disabled" = 2;

# Enable strict reverse path filtering (that is, do not attempt to route
# packets that "obviously" do not belong to the iface's network; dropped
# packets are logged as martians).
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians" = true;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" = "1";
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians" = true;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" = "1";

# Ignore broadcast ICMP (mitigate SMURF)
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts" = true;

# Ignore incoming ICMP redirects (note: default is needed to ensure that the
# setting is applied to interfaces added after the sysctls are set)
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" = false;

# Ignore outgoing ICMP redirects (this is ipv4 only)
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" = false;

Disable Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT)

Might cause significant performance cost.

security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading = false;

Force Page Table Isolation

security.forcePageTableIsolation = true;

Nix settings

Nix allowed users

This option allows only users group to connect to the Nix daemon.

nix.settings.allowed-users = [ "@users" ];

Other settings

Memory allocator

You can use security-focused memory allocator like scudo or GrapheneOS hardened_malloc.

# scudo
environment.memoryAllocator.provider = "scudo";
environment.variables.SCUDO_OPTIONS = "zero_contents=true";

# hardened_malloc
environment.memoryAllocator.provider = "graphene-hardened";

Some programs may not work with these memory allocators. You can force them to use the default libc allocator by blacklisting /etc/ld-nix.so.preload with a firejail wrap.

programs.firejail = {
  enable = true;
  wrappedBinaries = {
    chromium = {
      executable = "${pkgs.chromium}/bin/chromium-browser";
      profile = "${pkgs.firejail}/etc/firejail/chromium-browser.profile";
      extraArgs = [
        "--blacklist=/etc/ld-nix.so.preload"
      ];
    };
  };
};

Flush L1 data cache