NixOS Hardening: Difference between revisions
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=== linux-hardened === | === linux-hardened === | ||
[https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened linux-hardened] is a Linux kernel with additional hardening patches applied. | [https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened linux-hardened] is a Linux kernel with additional hardening patches applied. You can check for latest releases [https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened/releases here].<syntaxhighlight lang="nix"> | ||
boot.kernelPackages = let | boot.kernelPackages = let | ||
linux_hardened_pkg = { fetchFromGitHub, buildLinux, lib, ... } @ args: | |||
buildLinux (args // rec { | |||
version = "6.12.79-hardened1"; | |||
hash = "sha256-TKrLHk4aB47vqehEdp5ks4WtMCq/XCDr9ro3eQOoPvE="; | |||
extraMeta.branch = "6.12"; | |||
modDirVersion = version; | |||
src = fetchFromGitHub { | |||
inherit hash; | |||
owner = "anthraxx"; | |||
repo = "linux-hardened"; | |||
tag = "v${version}"; | |||
}; | |||
kernelPatches = []; | |||
structuredExtraConfig = with lib.kernel; { | |||
# | # Perform additional validation of commonly targeted structures. | ||
DEBUG_NOTIFIERS = yes; | |||
} // (args.argsOverride or {})); | DEBUG_PLIST = yes; | ||
DEBUG_SG = yes; | |||
DEBUG_VIRTUAL = yes; | |||
SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK = yes; | |||
# tell EFI to wipe memory during reset | |||
# https://lwn.net/Articles/730006/ | |||
RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION = yes; | |||
# restricts loading of line disciplines via TIOCSETD ioctl to CAP_SYS_MODULE | |||
CONFIG_LDISC_AUTOLOAD = option no; | |||
# Enable init_on_free by default | |||
INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON = yes; | |||
# Initialize all stack variables on function entry | |||
INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO = yes; | |||
# Wipe all caller-used registers on exit from a function | |||
ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS = yes; | |||
# Enable the SafeSetId LSM | |||
SECURITY_SAFESETID = yes; | |||
# Reboot devices immediately if kernel experiences an Oops. | |||
PANIC_TIMEOUT = freeform "-1"; | |||
# Enable gcc plugin options | |||
GCC_PLUGINS = yes; | |||
#A port of the PaX stackleak plugin | |||
GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK = yes; | |||
# Runtime undefined behaviour checks | |||
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/ubsan.html | |||
# https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2014/10/16/gcc-undefined-behavior-sanitizer-ubsan | |||
UBSAN = yes; | |||
UBSAN_TRAP = yes; | |||
UBSAN_BOUNDS = yes; | |||
UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS = option yes; # clang only | |||
CFI_CLANG = option yes; # clang only Control Flow Integrity since 6.1 | |||
# Disable various dangerous settings | |||
PROC_KCORE = no; # Exposes kernel text image layout | |||
INET_DIAG = no; # Has been used for heap based attacks in the past | |||
# INET_DIAG=n causes the following options to not exist anymore, but since they are defined in common-config.nix, | |||
# make them optional | |||
INET_DIAG_DESTROY = option no; | |||
INET_RAW_DIAG = option no; | |||
INET_TCP_DIAG = option no; | |||
INET_UDP_DIAG = option no; | |||
INET_MPTCP_DIAG = option no; | |||
# CONFIG_DEVMEM=n causes these to not exist anymore. | |||
STRICT_DEVMEM = option no; | |||
IO_STRICT_DEVMEM = option no; | |||
# stricter IOMMU TLB invalidation | |||
IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT = option yes; | |||
IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_LAZY = option no; | |||
# not needed for less than a decade old glibc versions | |||
LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE = yes; | |||
}; | |||
} // (args.argsOverride or {})); | |||
linux_hardened = pkgs.callPackage linux_hardened_pkg{}; | |||
in | |||
lib.recurseIntoAttrs (pkgs.linuxPackagesFor linux_hardened); | |||
</syntaxhighlight> | </syntaxhighlight> | ||
Revision as of 16:21, 7 April 2026
linux-hardened
linux-hardened is a Linux kernel with additional hardening patches applied. You can check for latest releases here.
boot.kernelPackages = let
linux_hardened_pkg = { fetchFromGitHub, buildLinux, lib, ... } @ args:
buildLinux (args // rec {
version = "6.12.79-hardened1";
hash = "sha256-TKrLHk4aB47vqehEdp5ks4WtMCq/XCDr9ro3eQOoPvE=";
extraMeta.branch = "6.12";
modDirVersion = version;
src = fetchFromGitHub {
inherit hash;
owner = "anthraxx";
repo = "linux-hardened";
tag = "v${version}";
};
kernelPatches = [];
structuredExtraConfig = with lib.kernel; {
# Perform additional validation of commonly targeted structures.
DEBUG_NOTIFIERS = yes;
DEBUG_PLIST = yes;
DEBUG_SG = yes;
DEBUG_VIRTUAL = yes;
SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK = yes;
# tell EFI to wipe memory during reset
# https://lwn.net/Articles/730006/
RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION = yes;
# restricts loading of line disciplines via TIOCSETD ioctl to CAP_SYS_MODULE
CONFIG_LDISC_AUTOLOAD = option no;
# Enable init_on_free by default
INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON = yes;
# Initialize all stack variables on function entry
INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO = yes;
# Wipe all caller-used registers on exit from a function
ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS = yes;
# Enable the SafeSetId LSM
SECURITY_SAFESETID = yes;
# Reboot devices immediately if kernel experiences an Oops.
PANIC_TIMEOUT = freeform "-1";
# Enable gcc plugin options
GCC_PLUGINS = yes;
#A port of the PaX stackleak plugin
GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK = yes;
# Runtime undefined behaviour checks
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/ubsan.html
# https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2014/10/16/gcc-undefined-behavior-sanitizer-ubsan
UBSAN = yes;
UBSAN_TRAP = yes;
UBSAN_BOUNDS = yes;
UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS = option yes; # clang only
CFI_CLANG = option yes; # clang only Control Flow Integrity since 6.1
# Disable various dangerous settings
PROC_KCORE = no; # Exposes kernel text image layout
INET_DIAG = no; # Has been used for heap based attacks in the past
# INET_DIAG=n causes the following options to not exist anymore, but since they are defined in common-config.nix,
# make them optional
INET_DIAG_DESTROY = option no;
INET_RAW_DIAG = option no;
INET_TCP_DIAG = option no;
INET_UDP_DIAG = option no;
INET_MPTCP_DIAG = option no;
# CONFIG_DEVMEM=n causes these to not exist anymore.
STRICT_DEVMEM = option no;
IO_STRICT_DEVMEM = option no;
# stricter IOMMU TLB invalidation
IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT = option yes;
IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_LAZY = option no;
# not needed for less than a decade old glibc versions
LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE = yes;
};
} // (args.argsOverride or {}));
linux_hardened = pkgs.callPackage linux_hardened_pkg{};
in
lib.recurseIntoAttrs (pkgs.linuxPackagesFor linux_hardened);
Lock kernel modules
This option locks kernel modules after the system is initialized. For example it prevents malicious USB devices from exploiting vulnerable kernel modules.
security.lockKernelModules = true;
All needed modules must be loaded at boot by adding them to boot.kernelModules. One way of knowing what modules must be enabled is to disable this option and then list all enabled modules with lsmod.
boot.kernelModules = [
# USB
"usb_storage" "uinput" "usbhid" "usbserial"
# DVD
"udf" "iso9660"
# GPU
"amdgpu" "i915"
# Networking
"nft_chain_nat" "xt_conntrack" "xt_CHECKSUM" "xt_MASQUERADE" "ipt_REJECT" "ip6t_REJECT" "nf_reject_ipv4" "nf_reject_ipv6" "xt_mark" "xt_comment" "xt_multiport" "xt_addrtype" "xt_connmark" "nf_conntrack_netlink"
];
Module blacklist
boot.blacklistedKernelModules = [
# Obscure network protocols
"ax25" "netrom" "rose"
# Old or rare or insufficiently audited filesystems
"adfs" "affs"
"bfs" "befs"
"cramfs"
"efs" "erofs" "exofs"
"freevxfs" "f2fs"
"hfs" "hpfs"
"jfs"
"minix"
"nilfs2" "ntfs"
"omfs"
"qnx4" "qnx6"
"sysv"
"ufs"
];
Kernel image protection
Prevents replacing the running kernel image.
security.protectKernelImage = true;
Kernel parameters
boot.kernelParams = [
# Don't merge slabs
"slab_nomerge"
# Overwrite free'd pages
"page_poison=1"
# Enable page allocator randomization
"page_alloc.shuffle=1"
# Disable debugfs
"debugfs=off"
];
Sysctl parameters
# Hide kptrs even for processes with CAP_SYSLOG
boot.kernel.sysctl."kernel.kptr_restrict" = "2";
# Disable bpf() JIT (to eliminate spray attacks)
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.core.bpf_jit_enable" = false;
# Disable ftrace debugging
boot.kernel.sysctl."kernel.ftrace_enabled" = false;
# Enable strict reverse path filtering (that is, do not attempt to route
# packets that "obviously" do not belong to the iface's network; dropped
# packets are logged as martians).
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians" = true;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" = "1";
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians" = true;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" = "1";
# Ignore broadcast ICMP (mitigate SMURF)
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts" = true;
# Ignore incoming ICMP redirects (note: default is needed to ensure that the
# setting is applied to interfaces added after the sysctls are set)
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" = false;
# Ignore outgoing ICMP redirects (this is ipv4 only)
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" = false;
Disable Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT)
Might cause significant performance cost.
security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading = false;
Force Page Table Isolation
security.forcePageTableIsolation = true;
Memory allocator
You can use security-focused memory allocator like scudo or GrapheneOS hardened_malloc.
# scudo
environment.memoryAllocator.provider = "scudo";
environment.variables.SCUDO_OPTIONS = "zero_contents=true";
# hardened_malloc
environment.memoryAllocator.provider = "graphene-hardened";
Some programs may not work with these memory allocators. You can force them to use the default libc allocator by blacklisting /etc/ld-nix.so.preload with a firejail wrap.
programs.firejail = {
enable = true;
wrappedBinaries = {
chromium = {
executable = "${pkgs.chromium}/bin/chromium-browser";
profile = "${pkgs.firejail}/etc/firejail/chromium-browser.profile";
extraArgs = [
"--blacklist=/etc/ld-nix.so.preload"
];
};
};
};
Nix allowed users
This option allows only users group to connect to the Nix daemon.
nix.settings.allowed-users = [ "@users" ];
Flush L1 data cache
Might cause significant performance cost.
security.virtualisation.flushL1DataCache = "always";
AppArmor
security.apparmor.enable = true;
security.apparmor.killUnconfinedConfinables = true;
Secure Boot
See Secure Boot. Limine bootloader supports coreboot's Secure Boot.